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&KDQJLQJ,GHDV&KDQJLQJ1RUPVWKH&DVHRIµWKH5HVSRQVLELOLW\WR
5HEXLOG¶ 
 
 
Whilst much has been written on emergence of new norms in international 
politics, we know significantly less about changes to the ideas and assumptions 
that underpin such norms. Examined at micro-level, most norms consist of a set 
of ideas and assumptions that form the basis of what is considered as 
appropriate, legitimate or even the required thing to do. Far from being stable, 
ideational constitutions of norms can undergo significant changes in the course 
of the norm emergence process. Enquiring into such changes is important if we 
are to move beyond static and linear accounts of norm evolution. Using changes 
in the ideational constitution of the R2P ± specifically, the de-emphasis of the 
responsibility to rebuild - as its vantage point, the analysis seeks to answer the 
following question: what drives change in ideational constitutions of 
international norms?  The chief argument advanced in this paper is that 
misalignments at the level of broader normative structures (external 
misalignments) and within norms (internal misalignments) result in changes in 
the ideational constitutions of emerging norms. 
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Introduction 
 
More than a decade after the endorsement of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle 
by the UN member states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the debate 
VXUURXQGLQJWKHSULQFLSOH¶VVWDWXVDVDQRUPLWVH[DFWSDUDPHWHUVDQGLWVLPSOLFDWLRQVto 
sovereignty have shown few signs of waning. While the 2011 intervention in Libya did 
little to settle such debates, its chaotic aftermath brought into sharp relief an overlooked 
aspect of the R2P: what happens after protection interventions? It is notable that the R2P 
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was initially premised on the notion of continuum of responsibilities, that not only entailed 
WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR UHDFW WR PDVV DWURFLWLHV EXW DOVR WR µIROORZ WKURXJK¶ DQG UHEXLOG
societies subject to protection interventions.1 However, since its inception, the notion of 
responsibility to rebuild has been de-emphasized in the scholarly and policy discussions 
on the principle and R2P today is understood primarily as a set of preventative measures.2 
This shift away from distinct rebuilding element in the R2P framework poses not only a 
set of urgent policy questions relating to aftermaths of R2P interventions as illustrated by 
the case of Libya, but it also provides an opportunity to theorize changes in ideas that 
underpin norms (that is, their ideational constitutions).    
 
Whereas a plethora of studies (Florini 1996; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Acharya 2004; 
Klotz 2002; Clapp and Swanston 2009; Clark 2010; McCoy 2001; Wheler 2000; Sikkink 
1993; Nadelmann 1990)  have examined how international norms change over time as 
they are replaced by new norms proposing alternative standards of behavior, this 
discussion shifts the level of analysis from the macro-level of norms to micro-level 
investigation on what happens within norms. The basic premise is that norms, understood 
KHUHDVµVWDQGDUGVRIDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRUIRUDFWRUVZLWKDJLYHQLGHQWLW\¶)LQQHPRUH
and Sikkink 1998:891), are composed of a set of underpinning ideas and assumptions that 
constitute the norm. For example, sovereignty is constituted by a set of ideas ± non-
interference, territoriality, legitimacy of authority - that together form what is understood 
                                                          
1
 The R2P in its initial version was composed of the responsibility to prevent (pillar I), responsibility to 
react (pillar II) and responsibility to rebuild (pillar III).  
2
 The argument here is not that rebuilding or peacebuilding has somehow disappeared out of practice or 
that international law contains no responsibilities of states in post-war contexts. The point here is to 
highlight how the distinct rebuilding element has disappeared from the revised version of the R2P 
principle.  
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to be the norm of sovereignty. This ideational makeup of norms is referred to here as 
ideational constitution.  Far from being stable, ideational constitutions of norms can 
undergo significant changes in the course of the norm emergence process and thereafter 
(Hirsch 2014). This is particularly the case prior to the cascade stage of norm emergence. 
$µQRUPFDQGLGDWH¶:XQGHUOLFKFRQWDLQLQJDVHWRILGHDVPD\EHSURPRWHGE\
norm entrepreneurs but a successful cascade often means changes WRWKHQRUP¶VLGHDWLRQDO
constitution as its precise meaning and content is negotiated by states and non-state actors 
(Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007:18) operating within normative structures defining 
appropriate and legitimate action within a given issue area. Needless to say, changes 
occurring in ideational architectures that underpin norms are of consequence to the 
meaning and application of norms.  Yet, surprisingly little research going beyond the 
macro-level changes in one set of norms to another exists to date.    
 
It is here - on changes in ideational constitutions of international norms - where the central 
interest of this paper lies.  The analysis is motivated by the question of what drives norm 
content change. The existing research has focused on how norm ambiguity gives rise to 
contestation, negotiation and ultimately, change in ideas that underpin norms and the role 
of norm leaders and entrepreneurs in re-framing norms (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 
2007, Krook and True 2012, Coleman 2013, Wiener 2004). In doing so, it has 
FRQYLQFLQJO\DQVZHUHGWKHµKRZ¶TXHVWLRQRIQRUPFRQWHQWFKDQJH+RZHYHUWKHDQVZHUV
WR WKH µZK\¶ DQG µZKDW¶ TXHVWLRQV SHUWDLQLQJ WR QRUP FRQWHQW FKDQJH DUH OHVV
comprehensive. Why do the ideas constituting norms change? What prompts change? 
Again, norm interpretability and endeavors by norm entrepreneurs to render norms more 
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widely acceptable are likely to be a part of the story.  Interpretability of norms creates 
opportunities for actors to promote their own conceptualizations of norms and can lead to 
change in the ideas that underpin them. Similarly, changing the content of norms can 
facilitate their dissemination. Yet, while norm interpretability and attempts to ensure 
successful diffusion of norms may drive change in the ideational constitutions of norms, 
such changes take place within a hierarchically-organized normative environment. 
Clashes with existing ideas, whether at the level of higher order or lower order norms, can 
result in recalibration of the ideas that constitute the proposed norm.  At the same time, 
change LQQRUPV¶LGHDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQV can be driven by dynamics operating within the 
proposed norm; misalignments of ideas underwriting norms tend to rise when ideas are 
not coherently linked to one another or dynamics between ideas become source of 
contention.  
 
The above claims form the chief argument advanced in this paper; misalignments at the 
level of broader normative structures (external misalignments) and within norms (internal 
misalignments) drive changes in ideational constitutions of emerging norms. This 
argument is developed by examining the ideational constitution of the R2P; the analysis 
centers on the de-emphasis of the rebuilding pillar within the R2P framework. The 
H[SODQDWLRQRIIHUHGKHUHIRU WKHFKDQJHLQWKH53¶V ideational content centers on two 
dynamics. The sequential link between the rebuilding pillar and the highly contentious 
µUHDFWLYH¶FRPSRQHQWRIWKHSULQFLSOHUHQGHUHGWKHIRUPHUXQDFFHSWDEOHE\DVVRFLDWLRQ
whilst the principle emerged at a time when ideas and practice on rebuilding war-torn 
states was moving away from emphasis on responsibilities of external actors and towards 
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WKHQRWLRQRIµORFDORZQHUVKLS¶,QWKLVZD\PLVDOLJQPHQWVDWWKHOHYHORIH[LVWLQJQRUPV
and among ideas constituting the norm are an important part of understanding the altered 
ideational constitution of the R2P. The analysis adds to the existing scholarship on 
international norms by directing attention to an un-investigated aspect of norm evolution; 
changes in the ideational constitutions of norms that can have significant implications of 
the meaning of the norm in question.  
 
The main objective of this analysis is to improve our understanding of changes in 
emerging norms¶LGHDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ and in doing so, facilitate theory-building on the 
WRSLF7KHFDVHRIWKHµUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRUHEXLOG¶SURYLGHVDJRRGRSSRUWXQLW\WRGR:KLOH
entirely representative cases of complex social processes are arguably difficult to find 
(Gerring 2007:79), the emergence of the R2P exhibits characteristics typical of norm 
HYROXWLRQ7KHSULQFLSOHZDVLQLWLDWHGE\DJURXSRIµQRQ-VWDWHDFWRUV¶WKH,&,66ZKR
developed the proposed norm on the basis of existing conventions and treaties on 
humanitarian operations. Its evolution thereafter has occurred in fits and starts and the 
ideational content has been shaped by a constellation of state, non-state and institutional 
actors, common to the evolution of international norms.  As such, knowledge generated 
from the case may be applicable to the evolution of other international norms.   
 
The analysis is organized as follows. The first section situates the paper in the existing 
research on norm content change by briefly reviewing the scholarship on the topic. It will 
then move on to setting out the theoretical assumptions guiding the analysis, followed by 
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a discussion of the case.  The main part of the paper traces the external and internal 
misalignments that marked the emergence of the rebuilding pillar.  
 
 
Existing Research 
 
Dynamics of Normative Change 
 
Few doubt that constructivist research has made great strides when it comes to our 
understanding of norms in international relations. Detailed analyses (e.g. Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, Risse et al 1999) of norm emergence and impact have enabled a move away 
from understanding norms solely through the lens of rationalism and towards a richer 
account of norms reflecting the logic of appropriateness. Although such studies have made 
a valuable contribution in terms of theory-building, they have produced a rather simplistic 
picture of norm evolution. Much of the first generation research on norms has tended to 
treat norms as stable constructs after having successfully followed a linear path to an 
established norm (Wunderlich 2013; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007; Krook and True 
2012). Norms are perceived either as being successful or unsuccessful; little attention is 
paid to the ways in which norms are adapted and changed in the course of their 
development and more importantly, how norm change can have a crucial impact on norm 
success and failure. This has resulted in a curious disconnect between the dynamic 
accounts of norm emergence and understandings of norm content as unchanging (Krook 
and True 2012:104).   
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Internal Dynamism 
To remedy this gap in our understanding of norm evolution, a promising line of research 
taking a micro-level view of norms has emerged in the recent years (Wiener 2004, 
Wunderlich 2013; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007; Krook and True 2012; Panke and 
Petersohn 2012 , McKeown 2009, Coleman 2013, Hirsch 2014).  This body of literature 
has enquired into a broad set of dynamics relating to norm evolution, ranging from studies 
RQ QRUP µGHJHQHUDWLRQ¶ DQG QRUP UHYersals (Panke and Petersohn 2012 and 2016,  
McKeown 2009) to the understanding how changes to the ideational content of norms 
enables norm diffusion (Hirsch 2014).  
 
A common theme in this line of enquiry has been the interpretability of norms, or what 
Krook and True (2012FDOOµLQWHUQDOG\QDPLVP¶3  Whilst a degree of ambiguity is 
likely to ensure that more actors will adopt norms, it is also likely to result in contestation 
over their meaning and form.  In this vein, Van Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007:219) point 
out that norm adoption rarely results in straightforward obedience or disobedience. Rather, 
ZKDWZHWHQGWRVHHLVµDEDWWOHRYHUWKHQRUPLWVHOI¶ In certain cases norms may even 
wither away. Panke and Petersohn (2016) find that norms that are not institutionalized but 
exhibit high degree of precision are more likely to die than norms that are embedded in 
international institutions and are vague. At the same time, the relative power of norm 
supporters versus those challenging it determines whether the norm in question survives. 
                                                          
3
 7KHFRQFHSWRILQWHUQDOPLVDOLJQPHQWGLVFXVVHGLQWKLVSDSHUGLIIHUVIURP.URRNDQG7UXH¶VµLQWHUQDO
G\QDPLVP¶LQthat internal misalignment refers to the way in which the ideas that compose norms are 
organised. Internal misalignments may arise not only because of tensions and contradictions within norms 
that Krook and True allude to but can also be caused by how the ideas that form the norm are arranged as 
the case of R2P suggests.  
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Others have made observations on the negotiation among actors on the norm content. 
Coleman (2013:116), for one, suggests that states are unlikely to merely reject or outright 
endorse new norms but instead, engage in negotiation with norm entrepreneurs and other 
DFWRUVRQWKHQRUPV¶FRQWHQW,QWKLVSURFHVVQRUPVDUHVKDSHGDQGUH-negotiated through 
bargaining and compromise. While ambiguity prompts norm content change, such 
changes can facilitate norm diffusion.  In demonstrating how changes in norm content 
enable its dissemination, Hirsch (2014) builds a typology of changes necessary for norm 
diffusion. This entails changes in the logic of consequences (anticipated gains obtained 
by applying the norm), logic of appropriateness (the morality underwriting the norm) and 
in the association between the norm and similar or competing practices.  
 
 
Agent-Driven Change 
 
If ambiguity RU µLQWHUQDO G\QDPLVP¶ JHQHUDWHV QRUP LQVWDELOLW\ DJHQF\ RI QRUP
entrepreneurs is necessary for bringing about norm content change. Norm leaders and 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV SOD\ D FULWLFDO UROH LQ WKH SURFHVV RI UHFDOLEUDWLQJ QRUPV¶ LGHDWLRQDO
constitutions by engaging in strategic framing (Krook and True 2012:105; McKeown 
2009; Lantis 2016). The activities of norm entrepreneurs in general and how their agency 
is implicated in norm content change in particular, has been a major focus of the 
aforementioned literature.  For example, for Hirsch and Coleman changes in the ideal 
content of norms are driven by the actions of norm entrepreneurs and norm leaders seeking 
to ensure the diffusion of the norm in question.  This is done through altering the ways in 
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which norms are framed and represented (Hirsch 2013) or through choosing venues for 
consultation about norms that favour certain types of outcomes (Coleman 2013).  Lantis 
(2016), in turn, foregrounds the role of leaders of great powers who can bring about a 
change in norms through the processes of redefinition and substitution.  
 
The above studies have generated important insights on norm negotiation and contestation 
but they have overlooked how misalignments of ideas that constitute norms may prompt 
norm content change. While external misalignments (i.e. lack of fit with other norms) are 
known to contribute to change in norm content, the argument here is that the way in which 
the ideas that constitute the norm are organized can also trigger change. Such internal 
misalignments are explained in detail in the following section. It is here, in the 
introduction of a new piece to the puzzle of norm change, where this discussion seeks to 
make its contribution to the existing scholarship on norm change.  Moreover, the paper 
proposes an approach to examining external misalignments from the standpoint of 
hierarchically-organised normative structures. It is argued that doing so enables a more 
detailed understanding of how the existing and emerging norms interact.    
 
 
.External and Internal Misalignments  
 
It is useful to start the analysis by exploring the dynamics central to the discussion. 
External misalignment refers to an incompatibility between the proposed norm and 
existing normative structures. Structures in international relations can be defined, 
IROORZLQJ6HZHOODVµVHWVRImutually sustaining schemas and resources that 
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HPSRZHUDQGFRQVWUDLQVRFLDODFWLRQDQGWKDWWHQGWREHUHSURGXFHGE\WKDWVRFLDODFWLRQ¶
7KH\IRUPDVHWRIEURDGDQGUHODWLYHO\VWDEOHFRQVWUDLQWVRQDFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXU/RQJOLQH
of constructivist research examining norm emergence has shown how correspondence 
with existing normative structures is critical to norm cascade (Florini 1996, Bernstein 
2001, Klotz 1999:22, Bjorkdahl 2006:215; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Keck and Sikkink 
(1998:204), for example, note how new ideas that successfully transition into norms fit 
µH[LVWLQJLGHDVLGHRORJLHV¶DQGµEHOLHIV\VWHPV¶LQDJLYHQKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W 
 
To be sure, agents can and often do transform structures in ways that create a better fit 
between a norm and existing normative structures. At the core of constructivist theorising 
is the co-constitution of structures and agents, opening up the possibility for change via 
agency of norm entrepreneurs and altered practices. However, to see normative structures 
solely as a creation of strategic action is to downplay the difficulty at which certain 
entrenched norms, particular those operating at the deeper level, can be changed. For 
H[DPSOH LQ WKHFRQWH[WRI WKH53(GZDUG/XFN REVHUYHVKRZDQ µDOO-star 
team of nRUPHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ZHUHXQDEOHWRFRQYLQFHWKRVHVFHSWLFDORIWKH53WKDWWKH
principle complements rather than undermines state sovereignty. Not only do deeply 
HPEHGGHG QRUPV DFTXLUH µWDNHQ IRU JUDQWHG¶ TXDOLW\ EXW DV %HUQVWHLQ 
suggests, normVEHFRPHFRQQHFWHGLQµQHWZRUNVRIUHODWHGIXQFWLRQV¶ZKHUHFKDQJHLQRQH
norm requires changes in other, related norms. This renders normative structures less 
malleable than suggested by accounts emphasising norm entrepreneur agency.  
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If we accept that normative structures condition the emergence of new norms, then they 
are likely to be an important part of explaining changes to the ideas that underpin such 
norms too. In other words, lack of fit with existing normative structures is likely to prompt 
revision to the ideational constitution of the norm in ways that align it more closely with 
the existing norms.  This lack of fit, or misalignment, can be manifested at different 
µOHYHOV¶RIQRUPV1RUPDWLYHVWUXFWXUHVDV'HVVOHU DQGRWKHUVKDYHDUJXHG, are 
KLHUDUFKLFDOO\ RUJDQLVHG &HUWDLQ UXOHV HQMR\ WKH SRVLWLRQ RI µKLJKHU-RUGHU¶ QRUPV LQ
contrast to less-GHHSO\ HPEHGGHG µORZHU-RUGHU¶ QRUPV %HUQVWHLQ  IRU
example, distinguishes between three levels of norms in this hierarchy. Level I norms are 
the deepest, higher-order norms providing the constitutive rules for the conduct of 
international relations, establishing who the legitimate actors are. These can be regarded 
DVµVHWWOHG¶QRUPVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV)URVW/HYHO ,,QRrms set out the 
VSHFLILFUXOHVIRULQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQDFWRUVLQGRLQJVRWKH\LGHQWLI\µEDVLFREOLJDWLRQV
RZHGWRWKHVRFLHW\RIVWDWHVDVDQHFHVVDU\DQGUHFLSURFDOUHTXLUHPHQWRIPHPEHUVKLS¶
(Bernstein 2001:187). They entail rules and principles such as diplomatic immunity. 
Finally, level III norms are those of the lower-order, regulating behaviour in specific issue 
areas of international politics, such as trade, human rights or security.   
 
The higher-order or level I and II norms, as Dessler (1989:469) observes, reinforce lower-
order (level III) norms; international agreements on the use of arms do not merely regulate 
the use of particular weapons by states but they fortify the underpinning norm of 
sovereignty which identifies states as the actors authRULVHGWRVLJQVXFKWUHDWLHVµ6XUIDFH-
OHYHO¶ QRUPV 'HVVOHU  UHJXODWLQJ VWDWH FRQGXFW LQ VSHFLILF LVVXHV DUHDV RI
12 
 
international politics are anchored in deeply entrenched higher-order rules. This hierarchy 
within normative structures provides a useful point of entry for thinking about external 
misalignments; it enables the development of specific claims about the type of 
misalignments that matter when it comes to norm content change. 
 
While misalignments with existing higher order and lower order norms are likely to result 
in change in the ideational composition of emerging norms, the case at hand suggests that 
PLVDOLJQPHQWVRILGHDVXQGHUSLQQLQJVXFKQRUPVµLQWHUQDOPLVDOLJQPHQWV¶FDQDOVRGULYH
ideational change. Internal misalignment refers to the ways in which ideas underwriting a 
norm are organised and connected to one another; failure to align the ideational building 
blocks in a way that is logical, acceptable or unambiguous can result in changes in the 
ideational composition of the norm. In other words, internal misalignments occur if 
relations between ideas are ambiguous, hierarchy between ideas unclear or there are 
tensions between the different ideational building blocks that constitute the norm. This 
can undermine the credibility of the norm as a whole. International misalignments can 
also arise from the organisation of ideas within a norm. Ideas constituting a norm can be 
arranged in a range of different ways. For example, a norm prescribing a particular 
behaviour consists of ideas that may be represented as being contingent on one another 
µLIDFWLRQ[WKHQDFWLRQ\¶RUDVVWDJHVLQDJLYHQDFWLRQµDFWLRQ[VKRXOGEHIROORZHG
ILUVWE\DFWLRQ\DQGWKHQDFWLRQ]¶Although it may be that internal misalignments are 
likely to affect norm evolution to a lesser degree than external misalignment, the case of 
R2P suggests that the seemingly mundane issue of how the ideational building blocks 
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constituting a norm are arranged can be of importance to the overall resonance of an 
emerging norm, as the case of R2P indicates.  
 
 
Alternative Explanations  
 
It is useful to juxtapose the argument advanced in this paper with explanations for norm 
content change derived from alternative theoretical perspectives. The purpose here is not 
to reject accounts of norm content change grounded in rationalism but rather to highlight 
why attention to the logic of appropriateness is necessary. For realist and liberal scholars 
of IR, change in ideational constitution of norms is expected to occur when it is in the 
interest of states, particularly the major powers.  In the case of the responsibility to rebuild, 
the reluctance of states to establish an obligation to rebuild states where humanitarian 
interventions have taken place can be explained with reference WR VWDWHV¶ VWUDWHJLF
interests. Although it may be in the interests of the major powers to engage in rebuilding 
missions in regions or states of strategic and/or security interest, major powers are 
unwilling to do so in instances where no such interests are at stake. On the other hand, 
from institutional perspective norms and broader regimes arise as a response to 
cooperation problems (Axelrod 1986). The emergence of norms is thus viewed as a 
demand-driven process. States follow the appropriate standards of behaviour prescribed 
by a given norm because it provides distinct functional benefits (Hurrell 1993:56). Their 
preferences on particular norms and their exact content may diverge and they seek to 
ensure that their preferences are reflected in the content of the norm.  Changes in norm 
content are thus the outcome of bargaining between states.  
14 
 
 
In examining the assumption that ideas underpinning norms change when they do not 
UHIOHFWWKHVWUDWHJLFLQWHUHVWVRIVWDWHVLWLVQRWHZRUWK\WKDWVWDWHV¶VWUDWHJLFinterests with 
regard to rebuilding operations have changed. Contrary to accounts that regard rebuilding 
PLVVLRQV DV DSROLWLFDO DQG VWULFWO\ KXPDQLWDULDQ SUDFWLFHV VWDWHV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ
peacebuilding and statebuilding missions is often not premised solely on humanitarian 
concerns but is also a function of strategic concerns and other interests. The critical 
literature on statebuilding makes the case that such operations are less interested in 
FUHDWLQJµMXVWSHDFH¶WKDQEROVWHULQJWKHLURZQVHFXULW\LQDn era where state fragility and 
failure has become securitised (Pugh et al. 2008). Particularly after the 9/11 attacks, the 
weakness and failure of developing countries have become to be seen as a security threat 
in Western capitals as underdevelopment has been linked to transnational terrorism, 
organized crime and migration.  
 
From this perspective, the fundamental rationale of peacebuilding and statebuilding 
operations is to maintain stability and status quo rather fulfil humanitarian aspirations. 
This would lead us to expect that Western states would have endorsed the idea of 
responsibility to rebuild, as it would legitimize their quest to stabilize weak states deemed 
as security threats. The opposite was the case, however. In their statements on the draft 
Outcome Document in June 2005, for example, only Japan and EU expressed outright 
support to sequenced responsibilities while many other key donor governments such as 
Canada, Sweden and New Zealand emphasized the preventative element of the principle 
(International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, date unknown).  One may argue 
15 
 
IURPVWUDWHJLFSHUVSHFWLYHWKDWQRWDOOUHEXLOGLQJPLVVLRQVDUHLQVWDWHV¶LQWHUHVWVZKLFK
UHGXFHG WKH :HVWHUQ VWDWHV¶ DSSHWLWH IRU HQGRUVLQJ UHEXLOGLQJ REOLJDWLRQV <et, if a 
humanitarian intervention is in the strategic interest of a state, it is hard to see how post-
intervention stabilization is not.4   
 
It is possible to understand the disappearance of the rebuilding component, and changes 
in ideational constitutions of norms more generally speaking, as a result of a negotiation 
between those states endorsing the norm in question and those opposing it. As in the case 
of the R2P the main controversy surrounded the reactive component, a compromise was 
struck whereby the less-controversial preventative component was brought to the 
forefront of the principle and the reactive element ± and consequently, the follow-up 
rebuilding obligation - was de-emphasised. This enabled the norm to enjoy support among 
greater numbers of states. At the same time, however, the opposition by the emerging 
powers and developing states to the R2P was grounded in the perception that the principle 
would undermine the norm of sovereignty. A lack of fit, thus, between R2P and the higher 
RUGHU QRUP VRYHUHLJQW\ LQGLUHFWO\ OHG WR WKH MHWWLVRQLQJ RI WKH 53¶V UHEXLOGLQJ
component, and the principle was refocused away from its military component and toward 
preventative action to make it acceptable to more states.  This points to the fact 
acknowledged by scholars working from different theoretical perspectives that interest-
based bargaining and norms cannot be disentangled in explanations of social action (e.g. 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Mills and Lott 2007). 
 
                                                          
4
 Here issues to do with resources might become relevant; statebuilding operations are highly resource-
LQWHQVLYHZKLFKPD\IDFWRULQWRVWDWHV¶GHFLVLRQRIZKLFKUHEXLOGLQJRSHUDWLRQVWRFRQWULEXWH 
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Indeed, it is not the case that explanations of norm content change on the basis of 
bargaining on the one hand and the impact of existing normative structures on the other 
are incompatible. Negotiation and bargaining, after all, do not take place in a normative 
vacuum; the commonly accepted standards of behaviour define the universe of options 
available to actors. In this sense then normative structures provide the context in which 
actors engage in rational decision-making. This is reflected in the fact that the ideational 
content of the R2P was brought in line with the higher order norm sovereignty. Such 
recalibration of the R2P arguably reflected not only strategic interests of states but also 
the entrenched view of the norm of non-intervention as the foundational norm of 
international politics.  
 
 
 
The Case Study of Responsibility to Protect 
 
Having laid out the analytical basis for the discussion, this section will outline the R2P 
and µUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRUHEXLOG¶LGHD(PHUJLQJQRUPVUDUHO\UHSUHVHQWHQWLUHO\QHZLGHDV
they generally stem from collectively held beliefs (Wunderlich 2013:27).  This is true in 
terms of the responsibility to protect principle. The conceptual roots of the responsibility 
to protect can be found in writings on humanitarian interventions and sovereignty.  The 
former French foreign minister, Bernhard Kouchner, advocated more than two decades 
ago an obligation to intervene in situations of humanitarian emergency, while Francis 
Deng with his colleagues made a case for reconceptualising sovereignty as responsibility 
in the 1990s (Luck 2012:90).  As Luck (2012:90) observes, the Canadian-initiated 
17 
 
International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) brought these 
strands of thinking together under the rubric of the responsibility to protect.   
 
The ICISS was formed in response to the debates on humanitarian intervention; the NATO 
operation in Kosovo in 1999, dubbed illegal but legitimate, coupled with the failings to 
stop genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda brought questions surrounding the use of military 
force for humanitarian purposes to the fore of the global governance agenda (Bellamy 
2009b).  By proposing the notion of the responsibility to protect, the ICISS sought to 
distance the protection of civilians from the lexicon of humanitarian interventions and 
shift the debate away from the right to intervene and toward responsibility to do so.   
 
7KHERWWRP OLQHRI WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V UHSRUWSXEOLVKHG LQ1, was that where states 
were unwilling or incapable of protecting populations from genocide and ethnic cleansing, 
the international community has the collective responsibility to do so.  While much of the 
report ± and scholarly and policy debate thereafter - was devoted to developing this line 
of argument, it also suggested two additional responsibilities for the international 
community. These were the responsibilities to prevent and rebuild. In terms of the 
preventative element, the ICISS outlined an obliJDWLRQWRµDGGUHVVERWKWKHURRWFDXVHV
DQG GLUHFW FDXVHV¶ RI FLYLO ZDUV DQG FRQIOLFWV ZKHUH SRSXODWLRQV ZHUH VXEMHFWHG WR
atrocities (ICISS 2001:19).  With respect to the latter, the Commission made a case for an 
REOLJDWLRQIRUWKHLQWHUYHQLQJIRUFHVWRµIROORZWKURXJK¶E\HQVXULQJVHFXULW\MXVWLFHDQG
reconciliation as well as economic development (ICISS 2001: 39,40-43). Taken together, 
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these three pillars of R2P were seen to form a continuum of responsibilities held by states 
and the international community.   
 
The norm, as proposed by the Commission composed of scholars and former statesmen, 
faced considerable opposition from states.  The positions of the key states and the debates 
in the years following the publication of the ICISS report have been extensively 
scrutinized in the existing literature (Bellamy 2006, Wheeler 2005) and due to space 
constraints cannot be rehearsed in full here. In brief, the notion of responsibility to protect 
was unacceptable to many developing states as it was seen as a pretext for further Western 
interventionism and direct threat to sovereignty (Bellamy 2006:151-152, Cater and 
Malone 2016:122-124).  Emerging powers such as China echoed the concerns over the 
53¶VLPSDFWRQVRYHUHLJQW\DQGHPSKDVL]HGWKHUROHRIWKH81Security Council as the 
only body that could authorize humanitarian intervention (Bellamy 2009a:87). For 
Washington the commitment to protection tasks, even where no clear US interest was at 
stake, made the principle restrictive and as a result, unattractive (Bellamy 2006:151). Due 
to the reluctance by some of the major powers to endorse the notion of responsibility to 
react to mass atrocities, a modified version of the principle was endorsed in the 2005 UN 
World Summit (Bellamy 2006). In the Summit Outcome Document two paragraphs were 
dedicated to the R2P, where states declared their commitment to the principle. One of 
PRVWVLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHVIURPWKH,&,66¶YHUVLRQRIWKH53DQGRQHWKDWHOLFLWHGJUHDW
deal scholarly attention (Bellamy 2006, Weiss 2006, Hehir 2010), was the emphasis on 
VWDWHV¶ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV WR SURWHFW WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH SRSXODWLRQV DW WKH H[SHQVH RI WKH
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contentious idea of such responsibility residing in the international realm. This marked a 
move towards a more statist vision of protection responsibilities.  
 
An aspect in the evolution of the R2P principle that has attracted less attention is the virtual 
disappearance of the rebuilding component of R2P.  Although the responsibility to rebuild 
was never the central element of the initial, ICISS-developed R2P, it was nonetheless seen 
as an integral part of the continuum of shared responsibilities between international and 
GRPHVWLFDFWRUVµ)ROORZLQJWKURXJK¶,&,66SDUDJUDSKLQWHUYHQWLRQVE\WKRVH
undertaking them was deemed necessary for creating self-sustaining peace and alleviating 
the need for future protection interventions. Ensuring security and facilitating the 
processes of transitional justice and economic development were regarded as the key tasks 
in this regard.  The pillar outlining such responsibilities was notable in its absence in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document that primarily emphasized conflict prevention. 
,Q WKH81*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\GLVFXVVLRQRQ WKH2XWFRPH'RFXPHQW¶VYHUVLRQRI53
only handful of states UHIHUUHG WR WKH ,&,66¶ WKUHH-stage idea of R2P (International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect).  Many remarks by state representatives 
foregrounded preventative action instead. The absence of the rebuilding component from 
the Outcome Document is all the more baffling in the light of the fact that the decision 
was taken in the Summit to establish the UN Peacebuilding Commission, designed to 
DXJPHQWWKH81¶VSHDFHEXLOGLQJFDSDFLW\ 
 
The rebuild pillar was omitted not only from the 2005 World Outcome Summit Outcome 
GRFXPHQWEXWDOVRIURPWKHVXEVHTXHQW816HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO¶VUHSRUWVRQ53ZKHUHWKH
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principle has been further developed. The 2009 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 
report and those following it have highlighted on the one hand the responsibilities of states 
over those of the international community and conflict prevention over the use of force to 
halt atrocity crimes, on the other. In the 2009 report, the Secretary General outlined a new 
version of R2P consisting of three pillars; the protection responsibilities of the state (pillar 
I), international assistance and capacity-building (pillar II) and, finally, timely and 
decisive response (pillar III).  
 
In practice, the de-emphasis of the rebuilding component has been manifested in the case 
of Libya. Hailed often as a textbook case of R2P interventions, the UN Security Council 
authorized in March 2011 the use of force by NATO allies to protect civilians in Libya 
from mass atrocities committed by the Gaddafi regime.  While the intervention prevented 
further atrocities by the regime, the post-intervention phase witnessed spiraling violence 
that has escalated into a civil war with two separate governments. The strategy of the 
international community has by and large been one of disengagement (Chorin 2013:377, 
Barfi and Pack 2012:19). The only major rebuilding agency present in the country has 
been UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).  Its presence has been premised on the 
notion of national ownership; in practice this has meant domestic responsibility for 
rebuilding the state. Donor governments have similarly foregrounded domestic 
responsibilities; their priorities in Libya have largely centered on the security sector, with 
specific focus on border control.  
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Although the Libyan authorities initially rejected calls for UN peacekeeping forces as they 
feared that foreign troops on Libyan soil might undercut the legitimacy of the new 
government, they have since requested assistance (Lynch 2011). Limited aid has been 
delivered (sXFKDVWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶V6HFXULW\-XVWLFHDQG'HIHQVH3URJDPPHLQ
but it is no exaggeration to say that Libyans were ultimately left on their own devices in 
the immediate years after the intervention as no comprehensive rebuilding programme has 
been put in place by the intervening actors. It has only been in the context of the rise of 
the Islamic State in Libya from 2014 onwards that the Libyan rebuilding process ± and 
the security vacuum ± has made its way into the international policy agenda.  
 
It could be argued that even though the rebuilding pillar no longer features explicitly in 
the R2P, it is implicitly embedded in its preventative capacity-building agenda. It is true 
that there is an overlap between preventative and rebuilding measures, such as good 
governance reforms. There are, however, concrete rebuilding tasks that are specific to the 
post-intervention phase that render the disassociation of the rebuilding element from the 
R2P framework more than a semantic change.  Provision of post-intervention security and 
rebuilding damaged infrastructure, are examples here. These type of measures outlined in 
WKH,&,66UHSRUWWKDWKDYHODUJHO\EHHQGURSSHGDWWKHH[SHQVHRISUHYHQWDWLYHµUHVLOLHQFH-
EXLOGLQJ¶XQGHUVWRRGDVWKHHPSRZHUPHQWRIZHDNVWDWes to develop their capability to 
thwart conflict through building the right kind of institutional infrastructure (A/67/929, 
para.11).  Yet, while resilience-building focuses on longer-term peacebuilding measures, 
short-term rebuilding tasks such as addressing a security vacuum, carrying out 
disarmament of former combatants, undertaking de-mining operations, protecting 
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minorities and ensuring the return of displaced populations (ICISS 2001:paragraphs 7.42-
7.49) are crucial to ensuring stability and paving the way for larger, longer-term 
institution-building processes. As the Libyan case illustrates, such measures have been 
absent in the aftermath of R2P interventions.  
 
 
Explaining Change in the Ideational Constitution of the R2P 
 
To begin explaining the fate of the rebuilding pillar, it is necessary to place it in the context 
of the existing normative structures so as to identify external misalignments.  As argued 
earlier, the agency of norm entrepreneurs is necessary for norm content change but such 
change takes place in the context of existing norms. Normative structures can be discerned 
from the prevalent discourses and practices as well as legal principles in the issue area 
(Coe 2015:277, Bernstein and Cashore 2007:352). An additional criterion is the extent to 
which actions that contravene the norm require justification (Bernstein 2000:467). In 
applying the first two of the above criteria ± prevalent discourses and practices ± to the 
ideational environment within which the responsibility to rebuild emerged, the so-called 
µOLEHUDOSHDFH¶PHULWVDWWHQWLRQIt was the ideas and thinking associated with liberal peace 
that represented the existing normative structures that the responsibility to rebuild idea 
needed to align with.   
 
Liberal peace refers to a set of assumptions held by donor governments, aid agencies and 
other actors pertaining to the political and economic organisation of societies emerging 
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from conflict. At the heart of post-conflict reconstruction missions led by international 
agencies is the attempt to transmit the norms of good governance and free markets (Paris 
2002).  Governance reforms regularly undertaken as a part of state-building missions 
entail (re)building of representative institutions, independent media, rule of law and civil 
society. Economic liberalisation, in turn, has generally entailed privatisation, reforms to 
the labour market and financial liberalisation, inter alia.  In unpacking the liberal peace 
further, sovereignty and territorial statehood serve as the higher order norms underwriting 
it. Although norms regarding the actors considered legitimate agents in statebuilding 
operations point towards a myriad of non-state actors, the projected outcome of 
statebuilding is a sovereign, territorial state.  Statebuilding operations can be conceived as 
µVRYHUHLJQW\-EXLOGLQJ¶ PLVVLRQV 3LLSDULQHQ  LQ WKDW WKH\ VHHN WR VWUHQJWKHQ WKH
capacity of states to act as sovereign governments both domestically and at the 
international level.5  At the same time, contemporary peacebuilding and statebuilding 
missions are premised on the goal of building functional and stable territorial state. This 
is because states able to deliver public goods and alleviate conflict through institutional 
structures are seen as drivers of peaceful co-existence (World Bank 2011:2).  
 
A related norm informing the practice of statebuilding pertains to agency. Much of the 
critique of statebuilding missions has focused on the illiberal means through which 
internationally led statebuilding projects have sought to liberalise war-torn and fragile 
                                                          
5
 Critics argue that the norm of sovereignty in the context of rebuilding missions is often violated, as the 
cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor, demonstrate. Yet, the well-established axiom 
in constructivist research is that violations of norms do not preclude their existence (Bernstein 2000:468). 
Detailed justifications by internatioQDODXWKRULWLHVRIWHPSRUDU\VXVSHQVLRQRUµVKDULQJ¶RIVRYHUHLJQW\FDQ
be found in the above cases which indicates acknowledgement that a norm has been violated. 
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states.  Partly as a response to such charges and partly due to the failure of the liberal 
peace model to produce quick results, thinking on rebuilding missions in international 
organisations and donor governments began to change in the late 1990s. The norm of 
µORFDO RZQHUVKLS¶ RU µORFDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ UHIHUULQJ WR WKH HPSKDVLV RQ GRPHVWLF
leadership in statebuilding missions, has since emerged. The scholarly critiques of the 
concept (Donais 2009, Narten 2008) aside, local ownership has become the one of key 
operating principles of the majority of peacebuilding agencies.  Together these higher and 
lower-order norms ± sovereignty, territoriality and local ownership - form the wider 
normative structures in the issue are of reconstruction missions within which agents 
operate. More importantly, these norms constituted the normative environment within 
which the notion of responsibility to rebuild emerged. As is argued below, misalignment 
with the existing norms of sovereignty and local ownership contributed to the demise of 
the rebuilding component of the R2P.  
 
As noted above, sovereignty undergirds rebuilding missions in that the activities of 
external rebuilding agents are constrained by the principle of non-interference. Moreover, 
the aim of statebuilding missions today is to consolidate the sovereignty of the target state.  
Even though sovereignty in the conventional sense has been far from inviolable norm in 
the context of peace operations, it is the reference point against which actions are justified. 
It is, of course, precisely this tension between traditional notions of sovereignty and 
protection of civilians from mass atrocities that gave impetus to the R2P principle and the 
QRWLRQRI µUHVSRQVLELOLW\ DV VRYHUHLJQW\¶ LQ WKH ILUVWSODFH7KHVH LGHDVKRZHYHUZHUH
received with considerable scepticism by some of the major powers and developing 
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countries, as documented by Luck (2012:90) and Bellamy (2009a:68-70). It is in these 
sovereignty-based objections to the R2P that an important part of the explanation for the 
disappearance of the rebuilding idea can be found; its sequential link with the 
FRQWURYHUVLDOµUHDFWLYH¶SLOODUUHQGHUHGWKHUHEXLOGLQJSLOODUXQDWWUDFWLYHE\DVVRFLDWLRQIn 
the early version of the R2P the three responsibilities (to prevent, react and rebuild) were 
seen as a continuum of responsibilities. Rebuilding responsibilities would become 
UHOHYDQWRQO\DIWHUWKHµUHDFWLYH¶SKDVHLVDFWLYDWHGHowever, as the reactive pillar was 
seen as an affront to sovereignty, wider support for the R2P became contingent upon 
downplaying the reactive element and as a consequence, the rebuilding pillar (Schnabel 
2012:53, Hilpold 2014:9-10; Luck 2012:95).  
 
Although these changes to the ideational architecture of the R2P did not spell an end to 
WKHLGHDRIµUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRUHDFW¶WKH\UHQGHUHGLWPXFKOHVVSURPLQHQW:KDWXOWLPDWHO\
enabled the reactive pillar to retain its place in the R2P agenda was its reinterpretation 
along more statist lines.6 While demonstrating a qualified support for the principle, the 
United States for example emphasized the responsibilities of sovereign states. This was 
evident in the influential Gingrich-Mitchell report on US policy on UN reform. It stated 
WKDWµWKH8QLWHGStates should endorse and call on the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly to affirm a responsibility of every sovereign government to protect its own 
citizens and those within its borders from genocide, mass killing and massive and 
sustained human rigKWVYLRODWLRQV¶7DVN)RUFHRQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV7KH*
similarly called for an understanding of R2P that foregrounded territorial integrity and 
                                                          
6
 Similar argument is made by Chesterman (2011:280), Weiss (2012:127), Bellamy (2006:155), Stahn 
(2007:108-110, 117) and Badescu and Bergholm (2009:291). 
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sovereignty (Cater and Malone 2016:124). For states skeptical of the R2P, the notion of 
µVRYHUHLJQW\DVDUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶UHDIILUPHGWKHH[LVWLQJREOLJDWLRQVE\VWDWHVUDWKHUWKDQ
the international community to protect their respective populations from mass atrocities.  
 
This recalibration of the reactive component, discernible in the 2005 Summit Outcome 
Document (paragraphs 138-139), was closer to the existing understandings of sovereignty.  
That the R2P proved incompatible with traditional conceptions of sovereignty is hardly a 
surprising observation. What is more noteworthy is the internal misalignment that 
rendered the rebuilding pillar unappealing. Not only did the rebuilding pillar, through its 
association with the reactive pillar, indirectly challenge the higher order norm of 
sovereignty, but internal misalignment occurred as a result of its sequential relation to the 
reactive component of the principle. As noted earlier, the ICISS saw the rebuilding pillar 
as a stage in a sequence of obligations that would become relevant only after the activation 
of the reactive pillar, in other words when military force was used to protect civilians. The 
rebuilding pillar, therefore, was conceptually and temporally tied to the reactive 
component which, in turn, was highly controversial among governments. This sequential 
association between the reactive and rebuilding pillars represented an internal 
misalignment in that the way in which the ideas constituting R2P were organized became 
problematic. In order to make the principle acceptable to greater number of governments, 
the internal reorganization of ideas constituting R2P (prevention, reaction and rebuilding) 
became necessary. As the rebuilding pillar was seen as temporally linked to the reactive 
pillar and as the controversial reactive pillar was toned down to generate consensus, the 
rebuilding component was also significantly de-emphasized.  This contributed to the 
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eschewing of the rebuilding pillar from the framework and led the way for the focus on 
the preventative pillar.   
 
If the association with an idea that clashed with a higher-order norm and the organisation 
of the ideas within the R2P framework rendered the rebuilding pillar short-lived, there 
was also an external misalignment at a level of lower-order norms. As suggested earlier, 
the lower-order norms prevalent in the domain of statebuilding in post-conflict or fragile 
states are those associated with the liberal peace.  The specific post-intervention tasks 
outlined in the ICISS report posed no challenge to the existing norms; economic 
liberalization, transitional justice, judicial reform and security sector reform proposed by 
the Commission are consistent with the prevailing discourse and practice on rebuilding.   
 
The fit between the responsibility to rebuild as conceptualized by the ICISS and existing 
norms on statebuilding is less clear, however, when it comes to the question of who ought 
to bear the responsibility for rebuilding. To this end, the notion of local ownership is 
critical. Local ownership refers to the idea that the shape and course of rebuilding of 
fragile and war-torn states should be determined by national and local actors rather than 
external statebuilding agents. As noted earlier, statebuilding operations in the 1990s were 
characterized by top-down, externally-imposed strategies and agendas. While they were 
mostly successful in preventing further violence, these missions were critiqued for 
FUHDWLQJZKDW*DOWXQJFDOOHGµQHJDWLYHSHDFH¶DQGUHstoring the pre-conflict status 
quo.  
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At the same time, similar critiques of externally-driven development projects emerged in 
WKH ZLGHU GHYHORSPHQW FRPPXQLW\ $V D UHVSRQVH RUJDQLVDWLRQV VXFK WKH 2(&'¶V
Development Assistance Committee (1996) declared sustainable development to be 
premised on local ownership.  A decade later the Paris Principles for Aid Effectiveness 
(2005), emphasizing domestic responsibility for development, were endorsed by major 
GRQRUJRYHUQPHQWVDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDODLGDJHQFLHVµ/RFDORZQHUVKLS¶KDVVLQFHEHFRPH
an integral part of discourse on post-conflict rebuilding discourse and practice, evident in 
the peacebuilding activities of organisations such as the African Union (2006:para.15) and 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission (Jenkins 2008:9). This suggests that the idea of the 
responsibility to rebuild was developed at the time when the ideational currents were 
flowing to a different direction: the emphasis of statebuilding activities was moving away 
from internationally-led missions to those underwritten by the notion of local ownership. 
Indeed, national ownership, in the context of development, was also emphasized in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document (para. 22).  One should not overstate the 
GLVFRQQHFWEHWZHHQWKH,&,66¶VQRWLRQRf rebuilding and local ownership; the report, after 
all, takes partnership between international and domestic actors as its starting point. Yet, 
the frequent emphasis on the distinct obligations of intervening actors sits rather 
uncomfortably with the discursive shift towards locally-driven rebuilding missions. In this 
sense the linking of the rebuilding pillar to the extant lower-order norms is likely to have 
lacked resonance.  
 
:KLOHWKHFKDQJHVLQ53¶VLGHDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDUHEXWRQHH[DPSOHDQGDVsuch do 
not enable making deterministic claims on all norm evolution processes, similar patterns 
of change can be observed beyond the R2P. For example, the anti-torture norm has 
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undergone what might be considered as an ideational change in the recent decades. 
Although no state today rejects the validity of the anti-torture norm, enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions and the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the 
exact meaning of torture has been challenged by certain governments (Liese 2009). The 
Landau Commission set up by the Israeli government, for example, suggested that 
subjecting an individual to pain and suffering did not necessarily amount to torture 
(ibid:31). This position was echoed by others, most notably the US government (ibid).  
 
An internal misalignment can be found in the blurred distinction between torture and 
mistreatment. As there is no clear-cut definition of torture in (what is arguably the key 
document on the issue) the Convention against Torture (Harper 2009) and as it does not 
categorically prohibit ill-treatment (Liese 2009:26-27), governments have undertaken acts 
that many would consider torture, categorizing them as instances of ill-treatment rather 
than torture (ibid.). This ambiguity at the heart of the Convention against Torture has left 
governments considerable room for interpretation (Harper 2009:895).  As noted earlier, 
internal misalignments arise when the ideas that constitute a norm lack clarity; in this case 
the absence of definitional clarity represents such a misalignment.  An external 
misalignment, on the other hand, is evident in the tension between the human rights norms 
and the obligation of governments to protect their citizens. This, as it is often argued 
(Allhoff 2003, Hoffman 2004), pits the rights of perpetrators of terrorist acts against the 
right to life by citizens of the country in question.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to complement the existing accounts of norm content change 
through an inductive study of changes in the R2P norm. A norm candidate, R2P, that 
initially consisted of three interlinked and sequential responsibilities to prevent, react and 
rebuild is today understood primarily in terms of its preventative pillar. Whereas the 
responsibility to react was de-emphasized due to the concerns over state sovereignty, the 
rebuilding phase was dropped altogether. Not only was the rebuilding element 
sequentially associated with the controversial reactive pillar, but it also emerged at a time 
when the discourse and practice surrounding statebuilding missions was moving away 
from internationally-led missions to locally or nationally-owned processes. This has had 
implications on the ground, as the Libyan case illustrates, where post-intervention 
responsibilities have largely been operationalized as domestic responsibility to rebuild.  
The analysis of the R2P and the responsibility to rebuild reveals two distinct dynamics 
operating at the broader, structural level and within the emerging norms themselves 
respectively; the incompatibility with existing ideas on the one hand and how an 
organisation of the ideational building blocks can result in recalibration of the entire norm, 
on the other.  
 
The above findings enabOH D PRUH UHILQHG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI µLQWHUQDO¶ DQG µH[WHUQDO
G\QDPLVPV¶RILQWHUQDWional norms (Krook and True 2012). At the same time, the paper 
has proposed approaching external sources of dynamism from the perspective of 
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hierarchically-organised normative structures. This can facilitate a more detailed analysis 
and understanding of the normative environment emerging norms face.  Importantly, the 
analysis suggests that misalignments even with lower-order, surface-level norms can 
prompt norm content change. It is of course the case that complex social process such as 
the evolution of international norms defy mono-causal reasoning. With this in mind, the 
dynamics highlighted in the discussion are best seen as necessary rather than sufficient 
causes for changes in ideational constitutions of international norms. Even so, they can 
bring us closer to capturing the intricate process of norm evolution in international politics.  
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